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General Warrants, Thematic Warrants, Bulk Warrants:  
Property Interference for National Security Purposes 
 
Paul F Scott* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When the security and intelligence agencies (‘SIAs’) – the Security Service (‘MI5’), the Secret 
Intelligence Service (‘MI6’), and GCHQ – were first given statutory basis, the primary power 
granted to them by statute (the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994) 
was that of interfering with property.1 This article considers the nature of and limits to that 
power in light of the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal relating to Computer 
Network Exploitation (‘CNE’) (‘hacking’, now often described as Equipment Interference (‘EI’)) 
and the changes to the regime of property interference contained in the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016. Treatment of these matters takes place with reference to the British constitution’s 
commitment to the value of private property rights and its suspicion of general warrants, as 
demonstrated most directly by the body of late eighteenth century case law resulting from 
attempts to suppress seditious publications, 2 as well as the modern categories of ‘thematic’ and 
‘bulk’ warrants. The article shows how the national security origins of the relevant powers have 
seen the common law’s usual suspicion of property interferences fail to create a meaningful 
obstacle to their exercise, but also that, due to these powers’ availability in relation to serious 
crime, the consequences of that failure leak out of the national security context. Though the 
2016 Act clarifies the law surrounding equipment interference it does so while expanding 
significantly the powers in question. And, because that Act preserves the powers of property 
interference under the 1994 Act – and in fact extends their availability to MI6 and GCHQ – the 
possibility of evading the safeguards which exist on those powers’ use may in fact be increased 
rather than diminished. Finally, there remain important questions about the compatibility of 
property interferences – and the regimes which govern them – with the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  
 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Public Law, University of Glasgow, paul.scott@glasgow.ac.uk. I thank Bernard Keenan, 
Adam Tomkins and Marta Iljadica for very helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussion of the 
issues raised by this paper. 
1 Security Service Act 1989, s 3 (now repealed); Intelligence Services Act 1994, ss 5-7. 
2 Amongst them: Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils 275, (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1, 
98 ER 489; Money v Leach, (1765) 3 Burr 1742, 97 ER. 1075; Huckle v Money (1763) 2 Wils KB 206, 95 ER 
768. 
General warrants 
 
In their analysis of the Security Service Act 1989,3 Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten addressed 
the system implemented by that statute which allowed for the authorisation, by Ministers via 
warrant, of ‘entry on or interference with property’,4 conferring on those who acted under such a 
warrant both criminal and civil immunity.5 The relevant section of the act, the authors suggested, 
‘amounts to statutory authorisation of ministerial general warrants for reasons of state necessity 
of the kind which the common law disapproved of in the celebrated case of Entick v Carrington.’6 
The decision in Entick, therefore, ‘must now more than ever be regarded as an anachronism of 
interest mainly to constitutional historians.’7 After that aspect of the 1989 Act was superseded by 
the Intelligence Services Act 1994, a redefinition of the functions of the Security Service (and so 
of MI5’s powers under the 1994 Act)8  was described by Murray Hunt and Peter Duffy as 
‘tantamount to the statutory repeal of Entick v. Carrington, reversing centuries of common law 
tradition on the respective roles of courts and executive in relation to the issuing of warrants.’9 
Each references the most famous of the late eighteenth century cases relating to the legality of 
general warrants (though not one in which the warrant at issue was one which was truly general 
in the sense of failing to specify the person(s) against whom it was to be executed).10 The Earl of 
Halifax had granted the King’s messengers (including the eponymous Nathan Carrington) a 
warrant to ‘to seize and apprehend’ John Entick ‘and to bring, together with his books and 
papers, in safe custody before me to be examined’. 11  Lord Camden, Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas was called upon to consider a number of questions. That which he identified as 
most interesting related to the legality of the warrant, for ‘if this point should be determined in 
favour of the jurisdiction, the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will 
be thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state 
shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a 
seditious libel.’12  
                                                          
3 Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten, ‘The Security Service Act 1989’ (1989) 52 MLR 801. 
4 Security Service Act 1989, s 3. 
5 Ibid, s 3(1). 
6 Leigh and Lustgarten, above n 4, 826. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Carried out by the Security Service Act 1996. 
9 Murray Hunt and Peter Duffy, ‘Goodbye Entick v Carrington: The Security Service Act 1996’ (1997) 
EHRLR 11.  
10 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029. On that case, see generally Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott (eds), 
Entick v Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
11 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1034. 
12 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1063. 
 To interfere with property is a prima facie trespass, which if it is not to be unlawful must have 
clear legal authority (authority which one would expect to be ‘clear in proportion as the power is 
Exorbitant’),13 and without which it is unlawful. Emphasising the special status of one’s private 
property (and in particular one’s papers), Lord Camden held that there was no such authority in 
English law: 
 
Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far 
from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection and though the eye 
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are 
removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the 
trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written 
law that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none…14 
 
Neither the history of government practice since the revolution of 1689, 15 nor a bare 
consideration of the utility of such a power, 16 sufficed to justify what the law did not explicitly 
permit. Nor did the invocation of state necessity justify an interference with property for which 
there was no legal authority: ‘the common law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor 
do our books take notice of any such distinctions.’17 As well as testifying to the common law’s 
commitment to a requirement of legality, Entick stands also for the rejection of national security 
exceptionalism.  
 
Similar statements as to the harmful effects of general warrants are found in other cases of the 
era, but in many of which the warrant, rather than identifying its subject, purported to empower 
the seizure of the ‘authors, printers and publishers’ of the seditious material, and of ‘their papers’. 
Both forms of generality – generality as to persons, and generality as to property – met with 
displeasure from the courts. In Entick, Camden noted that there was no ‘pretence’ that: 
 
the word ‘papers’ here mentioned ought in point of law to be restrained to the libellous 
papers only. The word is general, and there is nothing in the warrant to confine it; nay, I 
am able to affirm, that it has been upon a late occasion executed in its utmost latitude: 
                                                          
13 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1065-6. 
14 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1066. 
15 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1067-73. 
16 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1073-4. 
17 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1073. 
for in the case of Wilkes against Wood, when the messengers hesitated about taking all 
the manuscripts, and sent to the secretary of state for more express orders for that 
purpose, the answer was, ‘that all must be taken, manuscripts and all.’ Accordingly, all 
was taken, and Mr. Wilkes’s private pocket-book filled up the mouth of the sack.18  
 
In Wilkes v Wood itself Camden said of the power to issue general warrants that ‘[i]f such a power 
is truly invested in the Secretary of State and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect 
the person and property of every man in this kingdom and is totally subversive of the liberty of 
the subject.’19 These cases amount to a clear rejection by the common law of interferences with 
property which neither specify the person whose property is to be subject to interference 
(effectively leaving the sufficiency of the evidence against any given individual to be determined 
by those executing the warrant rather than those granting it) 20 nor the specific property to be 
interfered with.  
 
Entick (which we, following Leigh and Lustgarten, and Hunt and Duffy, can take as shorthand 
for the general warrant cases generally) is not usually treated as having laid down or attested to a 
rule which is special to the context of property,21 but one which applies wherever the state 
wishes to interfere with an interest protected by law (whether public or private).22 It applies, like 
Wade’s definition of the prerogative, to acts which alter legal rights and obligations: 23 for those 
which do not no legal authority is required.24 Nevertheless, the right to property is given special 
status in Entick, as in the common law as a whole, 25  which demands legal authority for 
                                                          
18 (1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1065. 
19 Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lofft 1, 98 ER 489, 498. 
20  In Money v Leach, Lord Mansfield said that ‘it is not fit, either upon reasons of policy or sound 
construction of law, that, where a man's being confined depends on an information given, it should be 
left to the officer to ascertain the person.’ Money v Leach (1765) 1 Bl 555, 96 ER 320, 323. The same point 
is made by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, IV, 288. 
21 But see Keith Ewing, ‘The Politics of the British Constitution’ [2000] PL 405, 408. For a discussion of 
Entick in the context of a right to property, see Paul Scott, ‘Entick v Carrington and the Legal Protection of 
Property’, in Tomkins and Scott (eds), Entick v Carrington, above n 10. The case is placed in its national 
security context by Tom Hickman in his ‘Revisiting Entick v Carrington: Seditious Libel and State Security 
Laws in Eighteenth-Century England’ in the same volume. 
22 See the discussions in Scott, above n 21 and the chapters by Tomkins and Endicott in the same volume. 
23 For which, see HWR Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals, (London, Stevens & Sons, 1980), pp 47-9, and 
‘Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law’ (1985) LQR 180, 190-194.  
24 On the rule of law implications of the purely administrative powers of the Crown (which the author 
calls its ‘ordinary powers’) see Adam Perry, ‘The Crown’s Administrative Powers’, (2015) 131 LQR 652. 
25 See Scott, above n 21, and Ewing, above n 21. See also Thomas Poole 'The Constitution and Foreign 
Affairs' (2016) 69 CLP 1, contrasting the treatment of property in Entick with that in Secretary of State in 
Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) 15 ER 9. 
interferences with property, for the redefinition of property rights, and for deprivations thereof.26 
Reflecting Lord Camden’s belief that ‘one should naturally expect that the law to warrant it 
should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant’ these things will require an authority 
which not merely exists but which is suitably explicit (the rule now known as the principle of 
legality).27 Similarly, if property is to be expropriated without compensation, that too must be 
made sufficiently unambiguous that we can be sure that the relevant ‘political price’ has been 
paid within the Parliamentary process.28 From one point of view, then, when Entick is described 
as having been rendered a ‘constitutional anachronism’ or has having been subject to ‘statutory 
repeal’, we encounter a blatant misunderstanding of that case, which speaks only of the need for 
authority and the fact that the common law does not provide such authority. It is implicit in the 
judgement in Entick – as it is (and must be) in the various other judgments relating to the right to 
property at common law – that the interferences inherent in the concept of a general warrant 
might plausibly be authorised by (a suitably unambiguous) statute. In this sense no statute could 
ever ‘repeal’ Entick, but only ever affirm it. Nevertheless, statutory regimes for interference with 
property might either accord with the spirit of the general warrant cases to a greater or lesser 
degree.  
 
National security, property interference, and ‘thematic’ warrants. 
 
As noted above, one of the potential bases of a power of property interference argued for in 
Entick was ‘state necessity’, which we would understand in contemporary parlance to include – 
perhaps exclusively, but certainly above all else – national security. Powers of property 
interference for crime-fighting purposes are contained in both the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (‘PACE’) and the Police Act 1997.29 Though the former is more intrusive than the 
latter (not limiting the forms of property interference which might take place, and allowing 
interferences to be authorised by a senior police officer, rather than a judge, or even a Minister) 
each provides important safeguards for certain categories of material, including journalistic 
material and that subject to legal privilege.30 Modern law provides in the context of national 
security a distinct suite of powers of property interference. It was not always thus. Lord Denning, 
in his report on the Profumo Affair, made public for the first time the Directive, issued by 
Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe, which defined the role of the Security Service and, in the 
                                                          
26 Scott, above n 26, pp 147-155. 
27 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
28 Scott, above n 21, pp 148-9. 
29 PACE Act 1984, ss 8-23; Police Act 1997, Part III. 
30 PACE Act 1984, ss 9-14 and Schedule 1; Police Act 1997, ss 97-100. 
absence of true legal regulation, governed its actions until the late 1980s. He also stated, 
emphatically, its legal position:  
 
The Security Service in this country is not established by Statute nor is it recognised by 
Common Law… The members of the Service are, in the eye of the law, ordinary citizens 
with no powers greater than anyone else, they have no special powers of arrest such as 
the police have. No special powers of search are given to them. They cannot enter 
premises without the consent of the householder, even though they may suspect a spy is 
there.31 
 
This latter statement was rendered false by the enactment of the Security Service Act 1989, 
which permitted the Secretary of State to issue, on request of the agency created by that act 
(‘MI5’), a warrant permitting the taking ‘of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of 
any property so specified’.32 Those actions which might be taken in relation to property are 
neither limited nor illustrated by the provision in question. The theme of property interference 
provides the first link back from the exigencies of national security to the general warrant cases. 
A second is that these warrants are granted not by a judge but by a Minister. If authorised by a 
warrant, no ‘entry on or interference with’ property was unlawful.33 A warrant could be issued 
where the Secretary of State thought the action in question necessary in order to acquire 
information which was ‘likely to be of substantial value in assisting the Service to discharge any 
of its functions’34 and which could not otherwise be obtained, and that suitable arrangements 
were in place to ensure the confidentiality of the information thus obtained.35 The functions in 
question were, originally, ‘the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection 
against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign 
powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means’ and the safeguarding of ‘the economic well-being of the 
United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British 
                                                          
31 Lord Denning’s Report (1963) Cmnd. 2152, [273]. 
32 Security Service Act 1989, s.3(2). For the background to the 1989 Act, see Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 
EHRR 433 and, in the UK context, Hewitt and Harman v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 657. The ability 
of the 1989 Act to ground a justified interference with the ECHR was established by Esbester v United 
Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD72 . 
33 Ibid, s 3(1). 
34 Ibid, s 3(2)(a)(i).  
35 Ibid, s 3(2)(b). 
Islands.’36 Neither ‘national security’ nor ‘economic well-being’ has ever been given statutory 
definition, 37  leading to suggestions that the limitation of the Security Service’s powers by 
reference to their functions (which continues to this day) is not a meaningful one.38  
 
While, for the reasons given above, a statute cannot conflict with – but only affirm – the rule in 
Entick, it remains the case that a statute authorising interferences with property might either 
conform to or offend against the spirit of the general warrant cases. Leigh and Lustgarten 
considered the 1989 Act to do the latter, identifying as objectionable in particular the absence of 
excluded categories of material (such as under PACE), the failure to limit the sorts of 
interferences which might take place, and the fact that the 1989 Act did not require the Service 
to identify ‘the property to be searched or interfered with (and how often), the persons who are 
targets, or the type of information which it is hoped to discover.’39 The most important of their 
points – the supposed absence of any requirement to identify the property to be interfered with 
– seems (on the face of the 1989 Act) contestable, at the very least. The formulation in section 3 
of ‘any property so specified’ – where ‘so specified’ is a reference back to ‘specified in the 
warrant’ – seems to require that a certain level of detail is included. Though exactly what that 
level of detail might be is contested, that phrasing seems sufficient demanding as to call into 
question the implication, carried by invocations of Entick v Carrington, that warrants under the 
1989 Act were equivalent to general warrants, for a truly general warrant – one which does not 
specify the person nor the property to which it applies – would (on this reading) have been ultra 
vires the statute and acts done under it therefore capable of giving rise to civil (and perhaps even 
criminal) liability. When the powers under the 1989 Act were superseded by the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994, to the reference to interferences with property was added a power to interfere 
with wireless telegraphy.40 The use of the relevant powers were no longer defined solely with 
reference to the functions of MI5 but also with reference to the functions of the newly avowed 
(and statutorily established) MI6 and GCHQ,41 warrants to whom will be granted by the Foreign 
Secretary rather than the Home Secretary. The requirements for the granting of a warrant were 
modified in number of ways, as they were again later by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
                                                          
36 Ibid, s 1. To these has been added the support of police authorities in the prevention and detection of 
serious crime (s 2(4)), on which see below. 
37 In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47 Lord Hoffman said (at [50]) that 
‘there is no difficulty about what ‘national security’ means. It is the security of the United Kingdom and 
its people’ but that ‘the question of whether something is ‘in the interests’ of national security is not a 
question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy.’ 
38 Hunt and Duffy, above n 9, pp 15-6. 
39 Leigh and Lustgarten, above n 3, 825. 
40 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 5(1). 
41 Ibid, ss 1, 3 and 5(2). 
Act 2000. The 1994 Act, however, retained (and retains to this day) the wording of the 1989 Act 
(‘of such action as is specified in the warrant in respect of any property so specified’), the 
interpretation of which is vital to the question of whether warrants are permitted here which are 
reasonably compared to the sort held in Entick to have no existence at common law. Once again, 
the plain meaning of the words seems on its face to require that the property be identified to a 
relatively high degree of specificity within a warrant if the interference is to be intra vires the 1994 
Act. These national security warrants should have been general neither as to the persons to 
whom, nor as to the property to which, they applied. The fact of Ministerial authorisation was 
not itself sufficient for the 1989 Act (nor the equivalent provisions of the 1994 Act) to render 
Entick a ‘constitutional anachronism’. And though significantly broader than the powers of 
property interference under, say, PACE, the powers in question might be (more or less plausibly) 
justified by reference to the more limited and exceptional context in which they are available. 
 
It is therefore both surprising and concerning that the Intelligence Services Commissioner, in his 
2014 report, observed that he had ‘expressed concerns about the use of what might be termed 
‘thematic’ property warrants’ issued under this provision. 42  Though thematic warrants are not 
formally defined (and their use does not seem to have been acknowledged or explained prior to 
the publication of that report), they can be understood as warrants which identify the persons 
and property to whom they apply by virtue of a theme which connects them, rather than their 
specific identity. Though such warrants are – as regards the interception of communication – 
available under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,43 that possibility is created by 
the peculiar definition therein of ‘persons’, which the act states to include ‘any organisation and 
any association or combination of persons’.44 Though that legislative grounding is problematic in 
its obliqueness, there is no equivalent basis for thematic warrants in the context of section 5 of 
the 1994 Act.  
 
Proceedings in the IPT 
 
                                                          
42 The Rt Hon Sir Mark Waller, Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2014 (HC 225, 2015), 18. The 
Commissioner accepted that the interpretation of the various agencies was ‘very arguable’ and stated too 
that he could ‘see in practical terms the national security requirement.’ 
43 Such warrants were first avowed in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report, Privacy and Security: 
A modern and transparent legal framework (HC 1075, 2015), [42]-[45]. 
44 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 81(1). 
The correct interpretation of the key phrase within the 1994 Act was the subject of consideration 
by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in Privacy International v Foreign Secretary (‘Privacy/GreenNet’),45 
relating to the legality of CNE, the avowal of the use which by GCHQ happened only during the 
proceedings and led to the publication of an Equipment Interference Code of Practice.46 CNE is 
carried out in accordance with warrants under section 5 of the 1994 Act and authorisations 
under s.7 (discussed further below). The Code, as brought into force,47 does not require that an 
application for a section 5 warrant contain specific details of the property to be interfered, but 
instead that it must contain, inter alia, ‘the identity or identities, where known, of those who 
possess or use the equipment that is to be subject to the interference’ and ‘sufficient information 
to identify the equipment which will be affected by the interference’.48  In holding that the 
approach taken by the Code was a lawful one, because the statutory language was to be 
understood as requiring only that ‘the warrant to be as specific as possible in relation to the 
property to be covered by the warrant… so that the property to be covered is objectively 
ascertainable’49 the Tribunal declared that: 
 
Eighteenth Century abhorrence of general warrants issued without express statutory 
sanction is not in our judgment a useful or permissible aid to construction of an express 
statutory power given to a Service, one of whose principal functions is to further the 
interests of UK national security, with particular reference to defence and foreign policy. 
The words should be given their natural meaning in the context in which they are set.50 
 
It is not the case, then, that the property to which a warrant applies need be specified. Instead, 
the property should be ‘so defined, whether by reference to persons or a group or category of 
persons, that the extent of the reasonably foreseeable interference caused by the authorisation of 
CNE in relation to the actions and property specified in the warrant can be addressed.’51 This 
conclusion was justified by reference both to the – unconvincing – distinction between the term 
‘specified’ as used in the 1994 Act and to the allegedly stronger statutory phrasing of ‘particular 
                                                          
45 Privacy International v The Secretary Of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-
CH (hereinafter ‘Privacy/GreenNet’). 
46 See the Draft Equipment Interference Code of Practice (February 2015) and the Equipment 
Interference Code of Practice (January 2016). 
47 By the Equipment Interference (Code of Practice) Order 2016 (SI 2016/38) (14 January 2016). 
48 EI Code of Practice (January 2016), [4.6]. 
49 Privacy/GreenNet, [47]. 
50 Ibid, [37]. 
51 Ibid, [38] (emphasis removed). 
documents specified’ in the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975,52 as well as 
to the fact that ‘specified’ in the 1994 Act was used in relation not just to ‘property’ but also to 
‘action’ and ‘wireless telegraphy’ and therefore ‘cannot have meant anything more restrictive that 
‘adequately specified’’.53  
 
As a result of this reasoning, though the 1994 Act seems on its face to accord with the spirit of 
Entick v Carrington, as interpreted by the IPT it offends against that spirit, empowering – in the 
Tribunal’s own example – the issuing of warrants which ‘permit GCHQ to interfere with 
computers used by members, wherever located, of a group whose activities could pose a threat 
to UK national security, or be used to further the policies or activities of a terrorist organisation 
or grouping, during the life of a warrant, even though the members or individuals so described 
and/or of the users of the computers were not and could not be identified when the warrant was 
issued.’54 Warrants under section 5 may therefore be thematic, identifying specifically neither the 
property in question nor those to whom it belongs. Crucially absent from the IPT’s reasoning is 
a direct consideration of Lord Camden’s point that ‘one should naturally expect that the law to 
warrant it should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant’, a principle of statutory 
interpretation repeatedly reaffirmed by the courts in the context of fundamental rights under the 
name of the principle of legality and whose robust application by the courts to interferences with 
private property would in other circumstances be entirely inevitable.55 If the principle of legality 
is to mean anything, it must mean not only that some interference with fundamental rights is 
clearly foreseen by the relevant statute (which is indeed true of section 5 of the 1994 Act) but 
that the nature and extent of interference which that provision is claimed to permit be clearly 
and unambiguously foreseen. That does not seem to be the case with section 5, and it is doubtful 
whether it is even the case, as the IPT suggests, that the ‘natural meaning’ of the words is such as 
to permit interferences with property on the terms it specifies.56 Entick v Carrington was proof not 
only of the common law’s adherence to the rule of law but of the inability of national security 
concerns (in the form of ‘state necessity’) to over-ride the need to demonstrate legal authority. 
Here, national security seems to operate as an exception not to the general requirements of the 
rule of law, but to the interpretive approach which has grown up around it, as evidenced by the 
otherwise gratuitous reference to the functions of GCHQ in the passage asserting the irrelevance 
                                                          
52 Ibid, [39].  
53 Ibid, [44]. 
54 Ibid, [65]. 
55 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. See also Scott, above n 21. 
56 Privacy/GreenNet, [37]. 
to the question of the general warrant cases.57 It is highly unlikely that equivalent legislation 
aimed at other public interest ends would be approached with the generosity that the IPT 
demonstrates. It would be one thing to create an explicit rule of the sort that the IPT implicitly 
puts into effect here – to say that the principle of legality has no application where the security of 
the state is at issue – but to claim that the natural meaning of the statutory language (‘property so 
specified’) is such as to permit warrants of the breadth envisaged does not convince. That there 
is no requirement that they be foreign-focussed (as bulk acts of interception under RIPA were 
required to be)58 nor that the information thus acquired be filtered down only according to 
requirements of proportionality and necessity (ditto) 59  makes the phenomenon of thematic 
warrants under the 1994 Act particularly concerning.60  
 
Serious crime and the danger of national security exceptionalism 
 
What had originally prompted Hunt and Duffy to suggest that Entick had been ‘statutorily 
repealed’ was not, however, the powers contained in the 1994 Act themselves, but the 
modification made in 1996, when the Security Service was given the new, additional function of 
acting ‘in support of the activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the 
prevention and detection of serious crime.’61 Given that the availability of warrants is defined 
with reference to the functions of the SIAs, the grant of a new function implies a greater 
availability of warrants. MI6 and GCHQ could, under the 1994 Act as enacted, apply for 
warrants on the basis of their functions relating to serious crime only where the property in 
                                                          
57 This interpretative exceptionalism would seem also to be at odds with the approach of the Supreme 
Court in HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2, where the principle of legality was applied – in the context 
of the freezing of terrorist assets – in holding that orders made under the United Nations Act 1948 were 
ultra vires that statute, the language of which was insufficiently explicit to justify interferences with 
fundamental rights. 
58 RIPA 2000, ss 8(4) and (5), disapplying the requirement that a warrant identify a single person or set of 
premises as the target where the warrant authorised ‘the interception of external communications in the 
course of their transmission by means of a telecommunication system’. 
59 Ibid, s 16. 
60  Indeed, the use of thematic warrants is sufficiently frequent that the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner has recommended that the SIAs develop a method of recording their reliance on such 
warrants in particular operations, something the 1994 Act does not require: The Rt Hon Sir Mark Waller, 
Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2015, 17-8. 
61 By the Security Service Act 1996, modifying s 1(4) of the Security Service Act 1989. Of the 1996 Act, 
Home Office Minster Baroness Blatch said that ‘the Government's reading of the position is that the 
celebrated case of Entick v. Carrington established the important principle that a person's house should 
not be entered without lawful authority… Authorisation by the Secretary of State in accordance with this 
legislation represents lawful authority. All that has changed is that the Security Service will now be able to 
apply for property warrants in pursuance of its new statutory function relating to serious crime, in 
addition to its existing national security and economic well-being functions.’ HL Deb 8 July 1996, vol 574 
cols 81-2. 
question is outside the British Islands; property interferences which take place in pursuit of their 
other functions may relate to property within the British Islands.62 There was therefore a further 
recognition of the distinction between national security purposes and crime-fighting ones: the 
most intrusive powers were available (in the British Islands) only in the formers context. 
Following the changes made by the 1996 Act, by contrast, MI5 might apply for a warrant 
authorising interference with property in the British Islands for crime-fighting purposes. The 
new provisions inserted into the 1994 Act by the 1996 Act purported to restrict the use of these 
powers, providing for an ostensibly limited definition of serious crime – that which either 
‘involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number 
of persons in pursuit of a common purpose’ or involves offences on conviction for which a 
person of 21 with no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to three 
or more years in prison63 (a limit which does not apply to the work of MI6 and GCHQ in 
relation to serious crime abroad).64 Notwithstanding this restriction, the effect of the 1996 Act 
was to make available significant powers of property interference in relation to matters of 
ordinary criminal law. As it was put by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in debate on the Bill: 
 
So far as I can see, what has happened casually, in a House which has remarkably few 
people in it, is to carry over from the national security, twilight, Smiley's People world, 
into the every day life of policing, excessive powers of a kind that this country has always 
resisted and which are basic to its freedom.65 
 
Hunt and Duffy’s concerns with this new regime of property interferences within the British 
Islands in relation to serious crime was twofold. The first related to the definition of serious 
crime, which though it purported to limit the availability of domestic warrants for crime-fighting 
purposes in fact amounted to a considerable expansion of powers of property interference so as 
to include, for example, ‘virtually all investigations by Customs and Excise and the Inland 
Revenue’ and ‘industrial disputes and political demonstrations.’66 This conclusion seems correct, 
and yet the offending criteria remain in place, meaning that the powers of property interference 
in the British Islands are not restricted to the context of national security or the fight against 
                                                          
62 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 5(3). 
63 Ibid, s 5(3A) and (3B). The same formulation is used in the Police Act 1997, s 93(4). 
64 MI5 can also apply for warrants to do things which fall within the functions of MI6 or GCHQ rather 
than MI5 itself, but not where the purpose of the action is the prevention and detection of serious crime, 
preventing it from using its ability to substitute for the other agencies to bypass the limits upon its own 
actions: ISA 1994, ss 4 and 5. 
65 HL Deb 27 June 1996 vol 573 col 1043-4. 
66 Hunt and Duffy, above n 9, 13. 
terrorism, but in fact exist in relation to much of which falls – or should fall – in the province of 
the ordinary police or the National Crime Agency. Powers which were originally justified by 
reference to the special exigencies of national security became available outside of the context. 
And so when the IPT interpreted section 5 of the 1994 Act as not requiring a high degree of 
specification in the identification of property to be interfered with, that decision has the effect of 
creating a broader power of property interference also in the context of ‘serious crime’ – a 
category which, as we have seen, includes much for which that label is a misnomer. If the IPT’s 
approach might have conceivably been justified on national security grounds, it nevertheless has 
significant implications outside of that context, making thematic warrants available also for 
crime-fighting purposes. A second concern about the 1996 changes was that the availability of 
property interference warrants for serious crime purposes allowed the Security Service to bypass 
the various safeguards which existed on the powers of the police (then primarily under PACE), 
including the need for judicial rather than executive authorisation and special protections which 
exist in other statutes for certain types of material – legal, journalistic, and so on. In light of the 
interpretation of section 5 endorsed by the IPT in Privacy/GreenNet, this point too becomes more 
urgent: section 5 warrants can be used to bypass other powers (and the safeguards which exist 
upon them) while themselves permitting interferences with property that begin to approach the 
generality of the warrants against which the common law so resolutely set itself. MI5 may seek 
and be granted warrants which permit it to interfere with property in the British Islands for 
crime-fighting purposes without detailing the property which is to be interfered with, so long as 
the identity of the property is ‘objectively ascertainable’ from the terms of the warrant.  
 
Authorisations under section 7 of the 1994 Act 
 
Alongside warrants under section 5 of the 1994 Act, that statute empowers (in section 7) the 
issuing of ‘authorisations’ to act outside of the British Islands, extinguishing any civil or criminal 
liability which might otherwise arise out of ‘any act’ done by virtue of the authorisation.67 They 
can be given only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that: any acts done under an 
authorisation are necessary for the discharge of some function of either MI6 or GCHQ;68 that  
satisfactory ‘arrangements’ exist to ensure that nothing will be done in reliance on the 
                                                          
67 As well as ensuring that there exists a formal record of the political authorisation of some act or 
operation, which cannot for that reason take place without the knowledge and consent of the Foreign 
Secretary. 
68 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 7(3)(a). Originally, authorisations were available only to MI6; the 1994 
Act was amended to make them available to GCHQ by section 116 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001. 
authorisation beyond what is necessary beyond for the discharge of such a function, and that the 
‘nature and likely consequences’ of any acts done in reliance on the authorisation will be 
reasonable ‘having regard to the purposes for which they are carried out’;69 and, finally, that 
suitable arrangements are in place to guard against disclosure of information obtained in this 
way. 70  Section 7 illustrates some of the ways in which an authorisation might be framed, 
including that it might relate ‘to a particular act or acts, to acts of a description specified in the 
authorisation or to acts undertaken in the course of an operation so specified.’71 It will be seen 
from that formulation that section 7 offers up a power which would wholly justifies invocation 
of Entick v Carrington, going far beyond what an eighteenth-century general warrant might have 
contained – so as to include, for example, acts such as homicide which interfere with the right to 
life rather than that to property – and similarly far beyond the thematic warrants under section 5 
approved of in Privacy/GreenNet. Two points must be made. The first is the distinction between 
the 1994 Act’s framing of the power to make authorisations (under section 7) and the power to 
grant warrants (under section 5): in the context of authorisations it was felt necessary by the 
drafters to clarify the sorts of acts which might be carried out and, in particular, the way in which 
they might be identified within an authorisation. The drafting of section 7 is therefore 
sufficiently explicit as to justify the sorts of ‘thematic’ warrants which the IPT held to be justify 
by the far more ambiguous section 5. Section 7, that is, has been drafted so as to overcome the 
principles of statutory interpretation which mitigate interferences with certain public law rights; 
section 5 has not and yet has been held nevertheless to evade those principles. Authorisations 
given for acts of a specified type (rather than specific acts) are described as ‘class authorisations’. 
MI6 had eight class authorisations (which ‘remove liability under UK law for day-to-day activity 
undertaken in pursuit of SIS’s statutory functions, such as the identification and use of Covert 
Human Intelligence Sources, Directed Surveillance and interference with, and receipt of, 
property and documents’) in place in 2014.72 GCHQ had seven.73. 
 
A second point relates to the geographic aspect. Both section 5 and section 7 distinguish acts 
within and outside of the British Islands.74 Section 7 applies only outside that area,75 while section 
                                                          
69 Ibid, s 7(3)(b). 
70 Ibid, s 7(3)(c). 
71 Ibid. s 7(4). 
72 Intelligence and Security Committee, above n 43, [233]. 
73 Ibid, [234]. The Intelligence and Security Committee has recommended that Ministers be periodically 
provided with a list of operations carried out under the class authorisations, but no such lists have been 
kept in the past: [PP]. 
74 Meaning, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, the ‘United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man’. 
5 (as originally enacted) limited the power of property interference for the purpose of preventing 
or detecting serious crime within the British Islands as compared to its possibility outside that 
area. On one hand, this of course reflects the fact that the ECHR, by virtue of its Article 1, 
extends – in the normal course of events – only to the territory of the Contracting Parties.76 On 
that basis, the Property Interference Code of Practice did not apply to section 7 and there is no 
power to issue codes of practice in relation to that provision. Now, the EI Code of Practice 
provides that MI6 and GCHQ should ‘as a matter of policy apply the provisions of this code in 
any case where equipment interference is to be, or has been, authorised pursuant to section 7 of 
the 1994 Act in relation to equipment located outside the British Islands’77  but makes that 
statement of policy ‘without prejudice as to arguments regarding the applicability of the 
ECHR.’78 But the geographical distinction might be though to reflect also a further element of 
the decision in Entick, whereby it has been taken to establish (or to speak to) the inability of the 
Crown to justify an otherwise tortious action against a British citizen in Britain by claiming that 
the act was an ‘act of state’ to which the Crown’s immunity applies.79 The ‘Crown act of state’ 
tort defence applies only to actions abroad (and possibly, even there, only to non-nationals);80 its 
application in the United Kingdom possible, if at all, only in relation to acts done to enemy 
aliens.81 To speak of the spirit of Entick v Carrington, then, is to reference an ideal which is 
necessarily limited in its scope; where the modern statutes authorising property interferences 
make geographic distinction, they are in that sense in keeping with rather than at odds with 
Entick. The changes introduced by the 1996 Act undercut that distinction by making possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
75 Subject to an exception permitting the doing of something within the British Islands to ‘apparatus’ 
believed to be outside it (or ‘in relation to anything appearing to originate from such apparatus 
(Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 9 (inserted by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001)) and 
another relating to property either mistakenly believed to be outside the British Islands or brought into 
British Islands after the making of the authorisation (s 10-14 (inserted by the Terrorism Act 2006)). In 
both cases, there exists a 5 day grace period between becoming aware of the property’s presence in the 
British Islands and ceasing to interfere with it. 
76 See on the question of the ECHR’s extra-territorial effect Bankovic v Belgium (2007) 44 EHRR SE5 and 
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18 and, in the domestic courts, Al-Saadoon v Secretary of 
State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811. 
77 EI Code of Practice (January 2016), [7.1]. 
78 Ibid, 33, fn 18. Privacy International has, since the IPT gave judgement in Privacy/GreenNet, made an 
application to the European Court of Human Rights regarding the use of section 7, in which this question 
of applicability can be expected to feature prominently. 
79 ECS Wade, ‘Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law’ (1934) 15 BYIL 98. 
Collier agrees: JG Collier, ‘Act of State as A Defence Against a British Subject’ (1968) CLJ 102, 111, but 
see Peter Cane, ‘Prerogative Acts, Acts of State and Justiciability’, (1980) 29 ICLQ 680, 686. 
80 See, most recently, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2015] EWCA Civ 843. On the specific point about nationality, see also Nissan v Attorney-General [1970] 
AC 179. 
81 Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262. On the doctrine generally, see Paul Scott, ‘The Vanishing Law of 
Crown Act of State’, (2015) 66 NILQ 367. 
broad property interferences in the United Kingdom, without the over-riding justification of 
national security considerations. Insofar, then, as the law of property interference reflects an 
ongoing aversion to general warrants, that aversion applies only to the home jurisdiction and, 
even there, to a lesser extent than was previously the case. 
 
The compatibility of CNE with the ECHR 
 
At common law, the absence of legal recognition for the individuals’ privacy interests meant that 
legal challenges to what were effectively privacy interferences often took place with reference to 
the individual’s property rights.82 Conversely, the fact that the property interference at issue here 
took place in order to facilitate surveillance meant that the key ECHR issue was that of 
compatibility with Article 8. In Weber and Saravia v Germany83 the ECHR distilled from its own 
case law six questions which surveillance norms - those the full operation of which cannot be 
revealed to the public at large without undermining their effectiveness – must answer if they are 
to avoid abuses of power and meet the requirement of foreseeability implied by ‘in accordance 
with the law’. These are: 
 
the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of 
the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of 
telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the 
data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; 
and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes 
destroyed…84 
 
Those same requirements were in Liberty/Privacy (No.1) 85  applied by the IPT to the various 
activities of the intelligence agencies whose existence was first alleged on the basis of the 
Snowden disclosures of 2013,86 and it was not contested in Privacy/GreenNet that they apply also 
                                                          
82 This was the case in Entick, but more obviously so in Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No.2), 
[1979] Ch 344, in which it was held that the tapping of the applicant’s telephone (which had taken place at 
the post office) was lawful notwithstanding the absence of statutory authority because there was no 
common law right of privacy to be interfered with, while nothing had been done which was incompatible 
with his property rights. 
83 [2008] 46 EHRR SE5 
84 [2008] 46 EHRR SE5, [95]. 
85 Liberty v Government Communications Headquarters [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H. 
86 Eventually holding, in Liberty/Privacy (No. 2) [2015] UKIPTrib 13_77-H that, prior to disclosures made 
as part of the litigation process, certain of those activities had been unlawful. 
to CNE.87 This is an important point: in analogising between property interference under the 
1994 Act and those in the general warrant cases, it can be easy to lose sight of the fact that the 
interferences in Entick took place openly, while those under the 1994 Act take place in secret, 
and so are rightly assimilated to the secret interception of communication, which if it is to be 
effective must not be known about by its targets. 88 Though there is nothing which directly 
prohibits the use of section 5 warrants to carry out open interferences with property (to which 
the Weber requirements would not apply), this use would be at odds with the statute and the 
work of the agencies which make use of it. It will be recalled that the IPT here held that what 
was required of a section 5 ISA warrant was that it ‘be as specific as possible’, so as to permit the 
Secretary of State to be satisfied as to its legality, necessity and proportionality. Where a warrant 
fulfils that requirement, the IPT held here, it by definition satisfies the first three of the Weber 
requirements.89   
 
The fourth to six of the Weber requirements cause more difficulty. The IPT’s had decided in 
Liberty/Privacy (No.1) that though (in this particular field) detail of those arrangements preventing 
powers from being exercised arbitrarily need not be placed in full in the public domain there 
must be ‘a sufficient signposting of the rules or arrangements insofar as they are not disclosed.’90  
The two criteria that must therefore be met are, first, that ‘[a]ppropriate rules or arrangements exist 
and are publicly known and confirmed to exist, with their content sufficiently signposted, such as 
to give an adequate indication of it’ and, second, that those rules or arrangements are ‘subject to 
proper oversight.’91 The nature of the political oversight of the SIAs has not varied substantially 
over time – the relevant bodies are the Intelligence and Security Committee (given statutory basis 
by the Justice and Security Act 2013) and the Intelligence Services Commissioner, whose work 
the IPT repeatedly praised.92 These oversight mechanisms are, however, retrospective and mostly 
                                                          
87  The Court of Human Rights has emphasised that the ‘decisive factor’ as to whether or not the 
requirements developed in the surveillance context apply is ‘the level of interference with an individual’s 
right to respect for his or her private life and not the technical definition of that surveillance: RE v United 
Kingdom (2016) 63 EHRR 2   
88 One important distinction, not further discussed herein, is that evidence acquire via CNE is – unlike 
that acquired via interception – admissible in legal proceedings. 
89 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [57]-[59]. 
90 [2014] UKIPTrib 13_77-H, [41]. 
91 Ibid. 
92 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [65] and [74]. Previously, complaints about the work of the Security 
Service could be made to the Security Service Tribunal and that of the Intelligence Service to the 
Intelligence Services Tribunal. There was no right of appeal the decisions of those bodies, while the 
relevant statutes purported to exclude judicial review of those decisions. Under RIPA, complaints against 
the intelligence services within the jurisdiction of the IPT (RIPA 2000, s 65) to the decisions of which the 
same exclusions apply (s 67(8)). When the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 comes into force, this situation 
will change – a point considered further below. 
general. The only relevant legal mechanism – a complaint to the IPT – is retrospective and, 
though not general, relies on an individual having knowledge (or at least suspicion) of action 
having been taken against him or her, with the Commissioner enjoying no statutory power to 
refer s.5 warrants to the IPT nor notify the victim of unlawful acts thereunder. Moreover, the 
Equipment Interference Code of Practice was issued only as a result of the IPT proceedings, and 
so the question of compatibility divides temporally, into that of compatibility of the relevant 
powers since the issuance of that Code, and their compatibility prior (treated here as relating to 
the period since the coming into force of the Property Interference Code in August 2009). The 
IPT held that these further requirements of Weber are indeed complied with by the EI Code of 
Practice and so, since its coming into force, the regime of CNE had been compatible with the 
ECHR.93  This left open the question of whether that regime was before then Convention-
compliant. Not all of the rules relevant to that question are either contained only in the Code of 
Practice, or exist ‘below the waterline’ (in the sense of being publicly acknowledged but not 
publicly disclosed); also relevant – the IPT claimed – was the work of the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner and the statutory rules which prohibit the disclosure by GCHQ staff of the 
(below the waterline) arrangements which statute requires to be in place.94 Others are contained 
in the Property Code of Practice, which dates from 2009, and so was in place at the relevant time 
(and still applies to equipment interference where not impliedly repealed by the IE Code of 
Practice).95 Detail of below the waterline arrangements given by the respondents here (some of 
them a gist of closed material) were held by the Tribunal to be ‘adequate, in the context of the 
interests of national security, to impose the necessary discipline on GCHQ’ and to provide 
‘adequate protection against arbitrary power’. 96  And though the existence of the ‘below the 
waterline’ arrangements in respect of CNE could not have been made known before the 
government avowed the use of CNE in 2015, it was foreseeable that hacking as a form of 
property interference would fall within the range of acts authorised by sections 5 and 7 of the 
1994 Act.97 As such, though the procedural protection might have been improved (and in fact 
was with the coming into force of the EI Code of Practice), whatever inadequacy there was 
present was insufficient to constitute a breach of the requirements of the ECHR: there was, even 
                                                          
93 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [70]. 
94 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [75]-[77]. 
95 EI Code of Practice (2016), [1.2]. 
96 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [77]. 
97 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [81]. This despite the fact that the acts in question were prima facie 
unlawful by virtue of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. The savings provision of that statute (s.10) was 
amended, during the litigation period, by the Serious Crime Act 2015. The IPT, at [20], held the 
amendment to be merely ‘clarificatory’, with the 1990 Act to be read subject to the powers in the 1994 
Act. I am grateful to Bernard Keenan for this point. 
prior to the EI Code of Practice, sufficient protection against arbitrary interference. 98  The 
Tribunal emphasised here that to comply with the second grouping of Weber requirements, 
requires ‘the provision, particularly in a national security context, of as much information as can 
be provided without material risk to national security’ and that the consequences of a holding of 
a violation on the basis of ‘perceived procedural insufficiency’ were such that a holding that the 
procedural requirements (or their publicity) was amenable to improvement did not necessitate a 
finding that the unimproved processes were incompatible with the Convention.99  
 
This decision seems problematic on a number of levels. The first is on its own terms, whereby 
there was sufficient protection against arbitrary interference even when there was no EI Code of 
Practice, before the use of CNE by the SIAs had been avowed by the Government, and before 
the ‘below the waterline’ arrangements disclosed here had been made public. Either the Weber 
requirements were met or they were not – that is, either the ‘minimum safeguards’ existed, or 
they did not – and, the IPT, in treating the question as a teleological one, detached from the 
requirements which feed into it, has impliedly asserted a right to make an overall assessment that 
is devoid of direct analysis, and for that reason not amenable to later replication. This conclusion 
is supported by the fact that it has interpreted the 1995 Act – contrary to the principle of legality 
which the courts, in the context of unlimited parliamentary competence, have placed at the heart 
of the constitutional order, as well as several hundred years of common law aversion to warrants 
of such breadth – to permit interferences with property not themselves individually specified 
means that it was not, the terms upon which property might be interfered with were not, until 
this case, remotely foreseeable to citizens. Indeed, the decision as to the quality of the law which 
permits CNE presumes that the interference with Article 8 enjoys an adequate legal basis. For 
the reasons given above, that may be true of some property interferences under s.5 of the 1994 
Act, but it is not true of those carried out pursuant to thematic warrants. Finally, and taking at 
face value its holistic and teleological approach, the IPT is curiously vague on the question of 
how the relevant requirements were been fulfilled prior to the publication of the EI Code of 
Practice and the (partial) disclosure of ‘below the waterline’ arrangements, apart from in its 
suggestion that those arrangements add nothing material to the contents of the Property Code. 
The core of its reasoning seems to be found in the reference to the consequences of finding a 
violation on the basis of ‘perceived procedural insufficiency’.100 The consequences in question do 
not include the making of a declaration of incompatibility: the insufficiency was not found in the 
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99 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [82]. 
100 [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [82]. 
statute itself, but in the other arrangements, while the IPT does not have the power to make 
such a declaration and there is no right of appeal from it to a court which does have such a 
power.101 A finding that the Weber requirements had not been fulfilled, however, might have 
prompted a vast number of claims of action contrary to s.6 HRA, of a sort that the IPT has been 
fending off since deciding, in Liberty/Privacy (No. 2), that the system by which intercepted 
material was shared with it by the American NSA had previously been non-compliant with the 
ECHR.102 What we witness is a second sort of national security exceptionalism (less tolerable 
precisely because it is implemented in a context in which the ECHR already imposes, in the form 
of Weber requirements, less onerous requirements than apply to Article 8 interferences generally), 
accompanied here both by a denigration of the importance of procedure and – indeed – a 
dubious characterisation thereof, widened so as to include quite fundamental issues regarding, 
for example, the use made of material obtained via CNE.  
 
But even if the decision here were the correct one, developments in Strasbourg tend to 
undermine the sort of generalised surveillance made possible by the interpretation the IPT gives 
to the 1994 Act. First, the decision of the Grand Chamber in Zakharov v Russia,103 holding that 
interception warrants must ‘clearly identify a specific person to be placed under surveillance or a 
single set of premises as the premises in respect of which the authorisation is ordered,’104 and 
that an authority authorising surveillance ‘must be capable of verifying the existence of a 
reasonable suspicion against the person’ subject to surveillance measures,105 must apply equally to 
exercises of the property-interference powers which constitute surveillance. Secondly, in Szabó 
and Vissy v Hungary,106 a Chamber of the Court stated that while the authorisation of the use of 
surveillance powers by a non-judicial authority can be compatible with the Convention, the 
supervision of their use by a ‘politically responsible member of the executive, such as the 
Minister of Justice, does not provide the necessary guarantees’ of independence.107 The context 
involved provisions of domestic law which appeared capable of enabling ‘strategic, large-scale 
                                                          
101 RIPA 2000, s 67(8); Human Rights Act 1998, s 4(5). Privacy International has announced that it is 
seeking judicial review of the IPT’s decision notwithstanding the former provision: Privacy International, 
‘Privacy International to challenge UK Government's use of general warrants to hack unspecified groups 
of people and computers’: https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/862.  
102 See Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKIPTrib15_165-
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103 (47143/06) 39 BHRC 435. 
104 Ibid, [264]. 
105 Ibid, [277]. 
106 (2016) 63 EHRR 3. 
107 Ibid, [77]. 
interception’,108 distinguishing Szabó from the Court’s decision in Kennedy v United Kingdom where 
the provisions at RIPA at issue did not permit the ‘indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of 
communications’.109 If these elements of the recent case law crystallise as requirements to be met 
by all broad surveillance measures, thematic warrants would seem to be compatible with the 
1994 Act (as interpreted by the IPT) yet incompatible with the ECHR. It would of course remain 
possible to evade the requirement by carrying out a property interference that does not 
constitute surveillance, but such interferences are those where the generality is likely to be of 
least value to the SIAs – there is little point in being able to target a large and only loosely-
defined group of people with a single warrant if the interference must be carried out with their 
knowledge. Instead, the correct route would be to interpret – as required by s.3 HRA – the 
powers to issue warrants in a manner compatible with the Convention, and so as incapable of 
grounding a thematic warrant. That is, the interpretive obligation within the 1998 Act would 
seem likely to mandate a conclusion diametrically opposed to that arrived at via ordinary 
common law principles of interpretation. This suggests either a remarkable divergence of the two 
regimes, or – more likely – a flawed application here of the common law’s method of protecting 
fundamental rights. 
 
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 Act, it will be recalled, lacks safeguards in relation to 
confidential material (unlike PACE and the Police Act 1997). It was these safeguards (amongst 
other things) which Hunt and Duffy were concerned that the 1994 Act might be used to evade 
once the Security Service’s functions had been expanded to include that of assisting in the 
detection and prevention of serious crime. The lack of safeguards in the Property Code had been 
condemned by the Court of Human Rights in RE v UK.110 It has similarly been accepted by the 
IPT that since January 2010 the regime under which legally privileged material was intercepted, 
analysed, used and destroyed was contrary to Article 8, 111  as it was accepted here that the 
acquisition and use of legally privileged material via CNE was so contrary.112 The EI Code, 
however, addresses the issue of legally privileged material and other confidential material,113 
providing greater safeguards than are contained even in the revised Property Code. The IPT here 
held that the new safeguards are sufficient to bring the CNE regime in line with Article 8 as 
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109 (2011) 52 EHRR 4, [160]. 
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property interference. 
111 Belhadj and others v the Security Service [2015] UKIP TRIB 13_132-8. 
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113 EI Code of Practice (January 2016), pp 15-20. 
regards legally-privileged material. The possibility of using the 1994 Act to evade the safeguards 
applicable to other interference regimes is therefore belatedly diminished. Like those made above, 
however, the point is rendered less urgent by the enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016 (‘IPA’). 
   
Property Interference under the IPA 
 
The IPA creates a new and specific regime for the authorisation of equipment interference of a 
sort recommended by the ISC in its report into the intrusive capabilities of the SIAs.114 Contrary 
to the ISC’s recommendation,115 however, the 2016 Act does not create an exhaustive regime for 
the exercise of all of the relevant powers, but leaves the 1989 and 1994 Acts in place.116 The 
primary form of authorisation is a ‘targeted interference warrant’, which ‘authorises or requires 
the person to whom it is addressed to secure interference with any equipment for the purpose of 
obtaining’ either communications, equipment data, or other information.117 They can be issued 
only where the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on certain specified 
grounds including ‘national security’ and ‘the purposes of preventing and detecting serious 
crime’, 118  that the conduct it authorises is proportionate, 119  that satisfactory arrangements 
regarding disclosure are in place,120 and (except in urgent cases) where it has been approved by 
one of the new Judicial Commissioners.121  
                                                          
114 ISC (n 43), [CC]. 
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116 Subject to the amendments contained in Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 251, and discussed further 
below. 
117 IPA 2016, s 99(2). For the definition of ‘equipment’, see s 135(1), which provides that it means 
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applied by a court on an application for judicial review’ in reviewing the decisions as to necessity and 
proportionality: IPA 2016, s 108(1) and (2). This mechanism (the so-called ‘double lock’), which applies to 
many other powers in the IPA, was the source of much controversy during the passage of the Act, 
particularly as to the question of whether it was equivalent to ‘true’ judicial authorisation, or represented 
some lesser form of judicial control of warrants. It would nevertheless seem to fulfil any requirement 
imposed by Article 8 ECHR that surveillance be subject to prior judicial authorisation. 
 Where there was much doubt as regards the 1994 powers, the Act is sufficiently explicit in its 
intention to allow targeted warrants to be ‘thematic’, relating to, for example, equipment 
‘belonging to, used by or in the possession of a particular person or organisation’, that ‘belonging 
to, used by or in the possession of a group of persons who share a common purpose or who 
carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity’ (or more than one such group, if the interference 
is part of a single investigation or operation), equipment ‘in a particular location’ (or more than 
one, subject to the same proviso)’.122 There is, therefore, no absolute requirement to specify 
either the persons or the property with whom these interferences will be carried out – ‘general 
warrants’ are in this way, and for one specific form of property interference, explicitly revived, 
and beyond the specific context of national security. That it was felt necessary to make such 
explicit provision in a statute the first draft of which was published before the decision in 
Privacy/GreenNet was handed down shows again how unconvincing was the IPT’s decision as to 
the correct interpretation of the 1994 Act. Targeted EI warrants may be granted also – under 
similar conditions – to the Chief of Defence Intelligence,123 and – under less similar conditions124 
– to law enforcement officers (in which case they are issued not by a Secretary of State but by 
the relevant ‘law enforcement chief’).125 These too may be thematic. To that extent, powers Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson thought better suited to the world of Smiley’s People have been regularised 
within the ‘every day life of policing’. 
  
The 2016 Act, however, does more than simply give explicit basis to those (thematic) warrants 
already employed by the SIAs. It also authorises ‘bulk’ EI, by which is meant EI ‘not targeted 
against particular person(s), organisation(s) or location(s) or against equipment that is being used 
for particular activities.’ 126  It was clarified, during the passage of the 2016 Act (when the 
                                                          
122 IPA 2016, s 101. 
123 IPA 2016, s 104. 
124 IPA 2016, s 106. Targeted EI warrants are available to law enforcement officers for the purpose of 
preventing or detecting serious crime, but also for various other purposes around preventing or mitigating 
death or damage to health: s 106(3). 
125 Only on publication of the draft bill was it admitted that the police already carried out CNE, under the 
thin authority of s 93 of the Police Act 1997; the IPA 2016 amends the 1997 Act so as to prevent its use 
for the purpose of obtaining communications, private information, or equipment data: s 14. This does not, 
of course, prevent it being used for other forms of CNE. 
126  Draft Investigatory Powers Bill 2015: Explanatory Notes, 83. Bulk CNE was raised in the 
Privacy/GreenNet case, though the IPT reserved for consideration ‘on particular facts and when questions 
of jurisdiction are examined, whether an individual complainant might be able to mount a claim’ 
regarding the use of s 7 of the 1994 Act for that purpose: [2016] UKIP Trib 14_85-CH, [63]. See also 
above (n 78): in the application to the Court of Human Rights mentioned there, the question of bulk 
CNE under the 1994 Act can be expected to figure prominently. What is said by the Strasbourg Court – 
government, prompted by a report of the Joint Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill, 
published its operational case for the bulk powers), that the distinction between targeted and 
bulk warrants is as follows: 
 
A bulk EI warrant is likely to be required in circumstances where the Secretary of State 
or Judicial Commissioner is not be [sic] able to assess the necessity and proportionality to 
a sufficient degree at the time of issuing the warrant… This might be for example where 
the purpose of the operation is target discovery and the security and intelligence agencies 
do not know in advance the identity of the new subjects of interest who threaten the 
security of the UK and its citizens.  
 
That is, bulk EI warrants fill the space beyond the outer limit of targeted warrants, which is the 
same as exists on section 5 ISA warrants. A bulk EI warrant is general warrant in perhaps the 
truest sense – general as to both the persons and property to whom it applies, with no 
requirement of necessity or proportionality imposed. Such a thing is no less pernicious simply 
because the particular form of property interference which it authorises is limited to that of 
interference with equipment. The conditions for the granting of a bulk EI warrant differ in two 
key ways. First, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the ‘operational purposes’ for which 
the material collected will be examined are necessary (as is its examination).127 Second, as with 
bulk interception warrants under both RIPA and the IPA,128 the availability of warrants for bulk 
EI reflects the geographic separation noted above, being limited to the acquisition of ‘overseas-
related’ material. 129  Such warrants, however, (again following a pattern set by RIPA) 130  also 
authorise ‘any conduct which it is necessary to undertake in order to do what is expressly 
authorised by the warrant’, including (most importantly) the acquisition of data, communications, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
particularly as regards the application of the ECHR to extra-territorial CNE – will be significant for any 
assessment of the Convention-compatibility of bulk EI under the 2016 Act. 
127 IPA 2016, s 178(d). The operational purposes specified in a bulk EI warrant restrict the examination of 
the material obtained thereunder. They must be chosen from amongst those found in a list maintained by 
the heads of the SIAs, to which new operational purposes cannot be added except with the authority of 
the Secretary of state, and a copy of which must be given to the ISC at quarterly intervals, and which 
must be reviewed by the Prime Minister annually: ISA 2016, s 183(5), (7), (9) and (11). The Secretary of 
State can approve the addition of an operational purpose to the list only if satisfied that ‘the operational 
purpose is specified in a greater level of detail’ than the purposes for which a bulk EI warrant may be 
sought: IPA 2016, s 183(8).  Given the breadth of those purposes, this is not much of a hurdle. 
128 RIPA 2000, s 16(2); IPA 2016, s 136. 
129 IPA 2016, s 176(1)(c), (2) and (3). 
130 RIPA 2000, s 5(6). 
or information relating to people who are not outside Britain.131 The effect of that provision is to 
potentially undermine the implicit geographical logic of Entick noted above. 
 
In his review of the operational case for the bulk powers under the 2016 Act, David Anderson 
QC (the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) described bulk EI as ‘a fast-developing 
alternative to bulk interception’132 and concluded that, though ‘an operational case for bulk EI 
has been made out in principle’, there was required ‘very considerable caution’, not least because 
of the untried nature of bulk EI and its ability to recover data which has never been sent 
anywhere.133 This last point recalls some of the dicta from the general warrant cases quoted 
above and the fact that a person’s papers are his ‘dearest property’. There is in the United 
Kingdom a long history of communications being intercepted, whether in the post office 
(including when telephone exchanges were sited there) 134  or elsewhere, with the relevant 
authority found in the murky depths of the history of the Royal Prerogative,135 or under the 
Interception of Communication Act 1985 and, later, RIPA. Powers of equipment interference – 
both targeted and bulk – are not, however, limited to communications in the sense of things 
communicated by one person to another, but apply also to ‘stored communications’ which, once 
the relevant definitions in the IPA are pieced together, reveals itself to be more or less anything 
found upon one’s computer. 136 This is a qualitatively different, and in many ways more intrusive, 
power than that of intercepting only what one communicate to another.137 If papers were once 
one’s ‘dearest property’, then how much dearer – how much more sensitive – the contents of 
one’s hard drive?  
 
                                                          
131 IPA 2016, s 176(5). 
132 David Anderson QC, Report of the Bulk Powers Review (August 2016), [7.33]. 
133 Ibid, [7.37]. 
134 On this point, see Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No.2), [1979] Ch 344. For a discussion of 
the history of telephone interception, see Patrick Fitzgerald and Mark Leopold, Stranger on the Line: Secret 
History of Phone Tapping, The Bodley Head (1987). 
135 See the Report of Committee of Privy Councillors, Interception of Communications, Cmnd 283 (1957) (‘the 
Birkett report’).  
136 In relation to targeted interference, see IPA 2016, ss 99(6) and (8) (the latter of which defines ‘stored 
communication’ as a communication ‘stored in or by a telecommunication system (whether before or 
after its transmission)’); s 261(13) (defining a ‘telecommunication system’ as ‘a system (including the 
apparatus comprised in it) that exists (whether wholly or partly in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) for 
the purpose of facilitating the transmission of communications by any means involving the use of 
electrical or electromagnetic energy’); s 261(2) (defining ‘communications’ to include ‘anything comprising 
speech, music, sounds, visual images or data of any description’ and ‘signals serving either for the 
impartation of anything between persons, between a person and a thing or between things or for the 
actuation or control of any apparatus’); and s 263(1) (defining ‘apparatus’ as including ‘any equipment, 
machinery or device (whether physical or logical) and any wire or cable’). 
137 See also the discussion of the intrusiveness of EI see Liberty, above n 117, [75]-[78]. 
Reflecting this, there exist certain safeguards on the use of material obtained via bulk EI, which 
work to ensure that the powers in question are not used to bypass the requirements of a targeted 
EI warrant. Specifically, material obtained through bulk EI (other than equipment data or non-
private information),138 may not be selected for examination if: 
 
any criteria used for the selection of the material for examination are referable to an 
individual known to be in the British Islands at that time, and the purpose of using those 
criteria is to identify protected material consisting of communications sent by, or 
intended for, that individual or private information relating to that individual.139  
 
This implies, conversely, that where the purpose of using those criteria in question is to identify 
material which is not ‘protected material’ (defined to mean, roughly, private information and the 
content of communications)140 then it can take place without additional authorisation. If it is 
desired to select information for examination in breach of this restriction, the SIAs must seek a 
‘targeted examination warrant’, which ‘authorises the person to whom it is addressed to carry out 
the selection of protected material obtained under a bulk equipment interference warrant for 
examination, in breach of the prohibition’ described, 141  for which the preconditions are 
equivalent to those for the making of a targeted interference warrant, alongside the requirement 
that ‘the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is or may be necessary to authorise the 
selection of protected material for examination’ in breach of the prohibition. 142  A targeted 
examination warrant may itself be thematic: though the thematic permissions offered in the act 
are fewer than are those relating to targeted EI warrants, they include nevertheless that a targeted 
examination warrant may relate to: 
 
(a) a particular person or organisation; (b) a group of persons who share a common 
purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity; (c) more than one person 
or organisation, where the conduct authorised by the warrant is for the purpose of a 
single investigation or operation; (d) the testing, maintenance or development of 
capabilities relating to the selection of protected material for examination; (e) the training 
                                                          
138 IPA 2016, s 193(1)(c) and (9). 
139 IPA 2016, s 193(1)(c), (3)(a), and (4). 
140 IPA 2016, s 193(9) and s 198(1) (defining ‘private information’ to mean ‘relating to a person’s private 
or family life’) and s.177 (defining ‘equipment data’). 
141 IPA 2016, s 99(9). 
142 IPA 2016, s 102(3). 
of persons who carry out, or are likely to carry out, the selection of such material for 
examination.143 
 
On one hand, the differential treatment of ‘domestic’ EI and ‘foreign’ bulk EI may appear an 
attempt to prevent the acquisition of bulk EI being used to bypass the limitations on the use of 
the targeted powers. In practice, however, the relationship between targeted and bulk EI may be 
exactly the opposite, given the availability of thematic targeted EI warrants. Because, as was 
pointed out by the Intelligence and Security Committee in its report on the Bill, however, a 
targeted warrant is ‘not limited to an individual piece of equipment, but can relate to all 
equipment where there is a common link between multiple people, locations or organisations,’144 
a thematic warrant can do much – though not, of course, all – of the work a bulk EI warrant 
might do, but with fewer procedural limitations. That is, targeted EI warrants are available to 
parties other than the SIAs (bulk EI warrants are not), do not require a national security purpose 
(bulk EI warrants do), and can be domestic-focused (which bulk EI cannot be). The 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation suggested in evidence to the Bill Committee that 
the provision for thematic warrants ‘effectively import[ed] an alternative means of performing 
bulk EI, with fewer safeguards’ 145  and that the government’s explanation (that in thematic 
situations ‘the Secretary of State and the Judicial Commissioner are likely to be able to adequately 
foresee the proposed interferences with privacy in relation to the data to be examined to a 
sufficient degree, such that the additional access controls under the bulk EI warrantry regime are 
not required’)146 potentially ‘place[s] excessive weight on the discretion of decision-makers.’147 
The Draft Code of Practice which will apply to thematic EI warrants under the 2016 Act states 
that ‘[t]he warrant application must also contain as much information as possible and be as 
specific as possible in relation to the equipment to be covered’ on the basis that that, as well as 
‘fully informing the issuing authority, this will also assist those executing the warrant so that they 
are clear as to the scope of what actions and equipment the warrant covers.’148 The concepts of 
necessity and proportionality therefore do significant work in ensuring that there is no misuse of 
thematic EI warrants, and much will depend on the standard of review applied by Judicial 
Commissioners to expressions of the Secretary of State’s belief that a particular thematic warrant 
                                                          
143 IPA 2016, s 101(2). 
144 Intelligence and Security Committee, Report on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill (HC 2015-16, HC 795), 
[14]. 
145 David Anderson QC, Written evidence to the House of Commons Public Bill Committee on the Investigatory Powers 
Bill (IPB46) (24 March 2016), [5]. 
146 HM Govt, Operational Case for Bulk Powers (March 2016), [8.6]. 
147 Anderson, above n 145, [5]. 
148 Equipment Interference: Draft Code of Practice (Spring 2016), [4.18]. 
meets the requirements of necessity and proportionality prescribed by the 2016 Act. There are 
no statutory limitations on EI as regards confidential information generally, though special 
protections are offered to legally privileged material, both in terms of its acquisition and its 
examination, requiring an identification of the ‘exceptional and compelling circumstances’ which 
make it necessary,149 and to journalistic material.150 These latter are, however, significantly weaker 
than the equivalent protections in PACE.151 
 
The IPA does not otherwise regulate interferences with property, which will continue to take 
place in accordance with the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Police Act 1997. The 1994 
Act will continue to contain general powers, there having been no moves towards – as was 
recommended by the ISC – setting out the agencies’ powers ‘clearly and unambiguously’ so as to 
avoid the impression of giving them a ‘blank cheque’.152 The IPA makes the use of EI warrants 
by the SIAs mandatory when taking action which would otherwise be contrary to the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 for the purpose of ‘obtaining communications, private information or 
equipment data’. 153  This restriction applies, however, only where ‘there is a British Islands’ 
connection,154 and so where there is not there would appear to exist what the IPT has called in 
another context ‘two lawful routes’ 155  for the conduct of EI – the IPA not being directly 
incompatible with the 1994 Act, it seems unlikely that the later Act will be held to have impliedly 
repealed the earlier one to the extent they permit the carrying out of equipment interference.156 
Though the IPA amends the 1994 Act so as to put MI6 and GCHQ in the same position as MI5 
as regards their ability to carry out property interferences in support of the prevention or 
detection of serious crime in the United Kingdom, 157  the ‘British Islands connection’ rule 
prevents that change being used to bypass limitations contained in the IPA. That does not 
                                                          
149 IPA 2016, s 112(4)(a) (targeted EI warrants) and s 194 (bulk EI warrants). For elaboration of that 
phrase, see s 112(6) and s 194(5). 
150 IPA 2016, ss. 13, 114, and 129(8). 
151 Cf Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Schedule 1, which makes provision for notification of the 
subject of a warrant and  inter partes argument before a judge prior to the granting of a warrant where 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is ‘excluded material’ (which includes certain 
‘journalistic material’) or ‘special procedure material’ (which includes other ‘journalistic material) on 
premises named in a search warrant. 
152 ISC, above n 43, [MM]. 
153 IPA 2016, s 13. 
154 IPA 2016, s 13(1)(b). 
155 Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH, 
[57]. 
156 For the rule of implied repeal, see Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590 and the 
discussion of it in Adam Tomkins, Public Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 107. 
157 IPA 2016, s 251, amending sections 3 and 5 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.  
counter fully the fear once expressed by Hunt and Duffy; other limits in other contexts may 
nevertheless be bypassed on this basis. 
 
If EI must now (subject to the exceptions described) take place only under the new powers IPA 
powers, it is impossible to know exactly what activities might (continue to) take place under the 
residual ISA powers of property interference. In the first place, it will include the sort of 
breaking and entering which Peter Wright had in mind when he wrote in Spycatcher that he and 
his colleagues had ‘bugged and burgled our way across London at the State's behest, while 
pompous bowler-hatted civil servants in Whitehall pretended to look the other way’;158 other 
elements will be interference with property (including equipment interference) or wireless 
telegraphy where the purpose is not to acquire communications, or equipment data, or other 
information.159 That is, CNE which seeks not to acquire data but simply to destroy or otherwise 
manipulate the functioning of electronic systems can still be authorised under the 1994 Act. 
What is clear, therefore, is that the decision of the IPT – as to the requirements that section 5 
warrants must meet, as well as to the ability of warrants to conform with the ECHR even as 
regards the heightened requirements which apply to norms permitting surveillance – ensures that 
the scope for legitimate use of these residual powers is far greater than would otherwise have 
been the case.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The common law’s opposition to general warrants does not logically preclude their statutory 
existence. On the contrary, legislation which empowers the making of such warrants is an 
affirmation of the decisions in Entick v Carrington and those cases which share the distaste 
expressed therein for warrants which are general as to the property and, especially, the persons to 
which the apply. Nevertheless, the decision of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in 
Privacy/GreenNet indicates that the common law has (for now at least) lost some of its suspicion 
of broad powers of property interference, in a way which conflicts more directly with the spirit 
of those cases. General terms in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 have been held to be capable 
of justifying interferences with property even where specific details of the property in question 
are not found in the warrant. This approach might be justified by reference to the considerations 
                                                          
158 Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking, 1987), 
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159 An example given by a commentator on the Investigatory Powers Bill (the identity of whom I can no 
longer trace) is that of disabling burglar alarms in order to facilitate entry into property. 
of national security which are reflected in the statutory powers – though a close reading of Entick 
v Carrington would seem to require a suspicion also of such appeals to state necessity – but the 
powers of the SIAs have never been limited to national security ends and the domestication of 
the powers to interfere with property by the Security Service Act 1996 Act and the IPA 2016 for 
purposes related not to national security but to the prevention and detection of serious crime 
means that the broad powers now recognised as existing are liable to be invoked even outside 
that particular context. Some of the effect of the IPT’s decision is superseded by the 2016 Act’s 
creation of powers of equipment interference which are unambiguously thematic, accompanied 
by new and (even) more intrusive bulk EI powers. In this sense, we are perhaps closer to truly 
general warrants than at any time since Entick was decided, with the relatively limited form of the 
property interference empowered doing little to dispel the impression that what has happened is 
in many ways equivalent to what was feared by Lord Camden: ‘the secret cabinets and bureaus of 
every subject in this kingdom’ have been ‘thrown open to the search and inspection of a 
messenger’ – though, given the geographic distinctions at work, this is truer of thematic than of 
bulk warrants. Alongside these new powers, there stand also the powers under the 1994 Act, as 
expanded in 1996 and 2016 (both section 5 and section 7 of which permit property interferences 
which are authorised thematically though not bulk interferences). The common law may well 
have set its face against general warrants, but statute now grounds a series of powers which are at 
least as damaging to the sanctity of property and – more importantly – the privacy of the 
individual which property helps to secure. 
